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REGULATION OF BusINEss-REFUSALS To DEAL-UsE To EFFECTUATE RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE-A manufacturer,1 acting unilaterally2 and in the absence of either a monopoly position or intent to monopolize,3 has a generally recognized right to refuse
to deal with any person and for any reason he deems sufficient.4
A confusing yet important problem in the field of trade regulation
is the extent to which a manufacturer may exercise this right to
maintain resale prices by refusing to deal with customers who do
not resell at his suggested prices. This difficulty does not arise in
the numerous jurisdictions having fair trade laws since these statutes permit a manufacturer to enter into contracts specifying the
minimum or stipulated prices at which his goods are to be resold.
These statutes, together with federal enabling legislation,5 exempt
from the sweep of the antitrust laws price fixing agreements otherwise illegal per se. In the past five years, however, there has been
a gradual breakdown in the overall effectiveness of fair trade.
A number of state courts have declared their fair trade laws unconstitutional in whole or in part for one or more of the following
reasons: (a) the non-signer clause, binding those who do not
contract with the manufacturer in addition to those who do, is
a deprivation of property without due process of law; (b) fair
trade laws result in an unlawful delegation of legislative power;
(c) fair trade laws violate state constitutional provisions against
monopoly or price fixing. 6 As a result of this deterioration of

For purposes of this comment, "manufacturer" is any vendor attempting to mainresale prices by refusal to deal.
2For illustrations of concerted refusals to deal see ·Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941). Compare Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, (9th Cir. 1957) 246 F. (2d) 368
with Johnson v. Yost Lumber Co., (8th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 53. See generally Barber,
"Refusals To Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 847 at 872879 (1955). See also 55 MICH. L. REv. 1035 (1957), as to application of rule of reason
to concerted refusals to deal.
8 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Gamco,
Inc. v. Providence Fruit and Produce Bldg., Inc., (1st Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 484, cert. den.
844 U.S. 817 (1952); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, (D.C. Minn. 1945) 63 F.
Supp. 32.
4 United States v. Colgate&: Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). See also REPORT OF THE A'ITORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMI'ITEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 137 (1955).
5 The Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1, and the McGuire
Act. 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45.
6See 42 CoRN. L. Q. 407 (1957). As of the date of that note, courts in 14 states had
invalidated their fair trade laws. Three states and the District of Columbia have never
passed such statutes. See generally cases cited in I CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[3085. Also,
as of 1954, it was estimated that consumer purchases under fair trade laws amounted to
only ten billion dollars, as compared with an estimated thirty ·billion dollars of consumer
1
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price fixing systems legalized under fair trade acts, the alternative
of maintaining resale prices by refusals to deal has become increasingly significant.
Renewed attention has been focused on the problems in this
area with the recent dismissal of the government's criminal action
against Parke, Davis and Co. 7 Parke, Davis, a manufacturer of
pharmaceutical products, had warned retailers in non-fair trade
Virginia and the District of Columbia that it would refuse to
deal with them should they continue to advertise 8 Parke, Davis
products below the suggested prices. The company had similarly
advised wholesalers not to deal with offending retailers and had
cut off the sources of supply of retailers who refused to comply.
The indictment charged Parke, Davis with entering into agreements with wholesalers and retailers to fix resale prices in violation
of sections I and 3 of the Sherman Act. Following presentation of
the government's case the defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal was granted. The court found "a complete lack of evidence" indicating any conspiracy or agreement to maintain resale
prices.0
This comment will examine the legal questions arising from a
manufacturer's exercise of his right to maintain resale prices
by refusing to deal with price cutters in an attempt to determine
whether this exists only as an abstract right, or whether it can
be translated into legally effective business practices.

I
In United States v. Colgate & Co.,10 the Supreme Court recognized that a manufacturer could lawfully refuse to deal with cus-

buying of goods, the resale price of which was maintained by other than fair trade laws.
Adams, "Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy," 64 YALE L. J. 967 (1955).
T United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., (D.C. D.C. 1957) 1957 CCH TltADx CM.
ff68,856. A civil action against the same company is pending.
s Apparently, Parke, Davis was desirous only of halting advertising of their prodncl3
at cut prices. There is no evidence that they attempted directly to restrain sales at prices
below those suggested.
o However, the record revealed uncontraclicted testimony from retailers that they had
"agreed" with Parke, Davis not to advertise at cut prices and from wholesalers that they
had "agreed" not to sell to price cutting retailers. The opinion did not refer to Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) or ITC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S.
441 (1922), the court instead reconciling United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300
(1919) with United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). For discm.uon of
these cases see infra.
10 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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:tomers who failed to resell at the manufacturer's suggested prices .
.,The following statement by the Court is the source of the legal
right to maintain resale prices by refusal to deal:
"In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long
recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an
entirely· private business, freely to exercise his own independ- ent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce ~n advance the circumstances under
which he will refuse to deal." 11
· Vital to the decision in Colgate was the Court's assumption that
'the criminal indictment alleged no contract or agreement, since
'in an earlier case12 the Court had invalidated a contract wherein
' a manufacturer had agreed with his retailers on the resalc'·prices the retailers would charge, holding that the agree. ment was void as a restraint of trade. The language of
cases decided after Colgate13 seemed so to limit the practices
which a manufacturer could employ in exercising his right to
refuse to deal that practical use of the "Colgate Doctrine" was
··seriously questioned. 14 In particular, FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., in
·condemning "methods in which the company secures the cooperation of its distributors and customers" to report price cutters,
enjoined practices which under Colgate were seemingly legitimate
and necessary methods in effectuating the basic right to refuse
to deal.1 5 In 1944 the Court again had occasion to consider the
application of the· Colgate doctrine when it struck down the
practices of a defendant who attempted to justify his distribution
policies under Colgate. 16 The court found _more than mere
acquiescence by the dealers, holding that there was cooperation on
the part of the wholesalers in the plan of the manufacturer, thus
bringing the case under the ban of Beech-Nut. More recently,

11 Id. at 307.
12 Dr. Miles 'Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
13 United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920); ITC

v. Beech-Nut Co.,
257 U.S. 441 (1922); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
'
14 "The Beech-Nut case has virtually declared illegal all effective methods of ex. ercising the right ..• approved in the Colgate case." Chafee, "Equitable Servitudes on
Chattels," 41 HARv. L. REV. 945 at 991 (1928). "Of course, one would not advise a seller
that he could effectively enforce resale price maintenance by cutting off price cutters."
Barber, "Refusals To Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
· 847 at 856 (1955).
15 See text preceding note 25 infra for a list of these practices.
16 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
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however, the Court approved Colgate in recognizing a publishing
company's right to refuse to deal.17 The Court stated that even
though Colgate had been limited and qualified, it still provided
protection for simple refusals to deal.
The general legal principles differentiating the Colgate doctrine from Beech-Nut can be readily stated. It is permissible for
the dealer to "acquiesce in the policies of," "go along with," and
"follow the practices of" the manufacturer; it is forbidden for the
parties to "contract, agree, conspire or cooperate with" each
other. Express agreement is seldom found; rather, agreement is
usually inferred from the conduct and practices of the parties.18
An examination of the mere refusal alone is not sufficient; it is
instead the factual business and market context in which the
refusal is exercised that must be the focal point of the analysis.19

II
In considering the methods a manufacturer may utilize to
effectuate resale price maintenance by exercising his right of
refusal to deal, it is important to note that "the cases ... indicate
that the line between legality and illegality ... is a fine one, and
will in each case, depend upon the facts proved."20 Though
the warnings of the legal commentators are particularly discouraging,21 careful study of the cases serves to emphasize the narrowness
of the area of permissible methods, rather than that there is
no room for a plan to be both legal and effective.22 Additional

17 "This Court's decisions have recognized individual refusals to sell as a general right
though 'neither absolute nor exempt from regulation.' • • . Although much hedged
about by later cases, Colgate's principle protects defendant's simple refusal to sell..••"
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 625 (1953). See also
Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
18 Frey &: Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); FTC v. Beech-Nut Co.,
257 U.S. 441 (1922). Cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
19 Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, (9th Cir. 1957) 246 F. (2d) 368. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 137 (1955).
20 Judge Medina in Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1950)
10 F.R.D. 367 at 371. See also United States v. Bausch &: Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944),
and Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v. FTC, (6th Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 337.
21 See note 13 supra. Compare Timberg, "Selection of Customers," in How To COMPLY
WITH THE ANTITRUST LAws 117 (1954) with Austern, "Dealing with Uncertainties," id. at
343. See also 58 YALE L. J. 1121 (1949).
22 See especially United States v. £ausch &: Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 at 729 (1944):
"T,he path is narrow between the permissible selection of customers under .the decision in
Colgate and Co. and unlawful arrangements as to prices under this decree, but we think
Soft-lite is entitled to traverse it. . . ."
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encouragement is perhaps to be found in the recent Parke, Davis
case23 indicating that there is a workable area for the application
of Colgate to the problem of the price cutter. In adopting a
plan to effectuate resale price maintenance, there are four principal matters to be considered: (a) notifying customers of the
manufacturer's pricing policies; (b) discovering violators; (c)
warning such violators; (d) possible reinstatement of customers
who have been cut off after ignoring repeated warnings. The
legal problems present in each must be separately examined.
A. It is first necessary for a manufacturer to announce that
he has a policy of insisting on resale price maintenance and that
to effectuate this policy he will refuse to deal with any retailer
who fails to observe his suggested resale prices and with any
wholesaler who sells to offending retailers. His policy may be
effectively communicated by such diverse means as trade journals, order blanks, individual announcements to dealers, or price
lists. Though any of these means can probably be used safely, to
avoid any taint of conspiratorial conduct beyond "conscious parallelism"24 it would seem desirable to abstain from announcements
to the trade generally and to make use of an individual notification to each customer, thus calling for a unilateral decision from
him.
B. It is essential next to have an effective system for detecting
price cutters. The Beech-Nut order prohibited a number of practices which would seem necessary to this end; specifically, use of
symbols on the goods to trace offending dealers, use of salesmen
and agents to detect violators, reporting of price cutters, and
maintenance of a "Do Not Sell" list of such violators. However,
in Beech-Nut "cooperation" between manufacturer and dealers
was found; the dealers were encouraged to and did report violations by competitors, and it was in this context that the order
was framed to prohibit such cooperative measures. 25 It is doubtful that such practices would be enjoined if presented as part
of a plan where the element of agreement or cooperation was
absent.26 Since it is "agreement" that is illegal, it seems illogical
23 Note 7 supra.
24 Compare Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208

(1939) with Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954). See also
64 YALE L. J. 581 (1955).
25 ITC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441 at 455-456 (1922).
26 See Dunn, "Resale Price Maintenance," 32 YALE L. J. 676 at 704 (1923). See also
27 CoL. L. REY. 183 at 187 (1927).
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to refuse a manufacturer the right to use his own agents and employees to detect and report price cutters, and lower court decisions have almost without exception permitted him to do so.27
Similarly, the seller should also be permitted to use symbols to
identify the goods28 and to trace them into the hands of price
cutters. It would also appear highly unrealistic to permit the
manufacturer to refuse to sell to certain customers and yet not
allow him to maintain a list of such customers.29 A different
element exists when a manufacturer solicits the active assistance
of dealers to detect and report price cutting competitors. Though
it would not seem to be illegal for a manufacturer to receive and
make use of reports gratuitously submitted by dealers, 30 agreement will be inferred when the manufacturer requests such assistance.31 Thus, it is clear that the manufacturer may employ
only unilateral means, and must avoid any cooperative practices
to detect price cutters.
C. As price cutters are discovered, a manufacturer may
wish to issue warnings to attempt to bring them into line on
their pricing policies. 32 If such warnings take the form of requests for assurances or promises of future compliance, this will
almost certainly bring the plan under the condemnation of
Beech-Nut. 33 Instead, the dealer must be confronted with a choice
in which he is advised of the alternatives of compliance or cessation of business relations, leaving the decision to his own independent judgment.34 The cases indicate that a statement to

27 Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v. FTC, (6th Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 337; Cream
of Wheat Co. v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 40. But see Grebe & Co. v. Siegel, (D.C.
R.I. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 175.
28 Contra, Grebe & Co. v. Siegel, (D.C. R.I. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 175.
20 Sec Chafee "Equitable Servitudes on Chattels," 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 at 991 (1928).
30 Cream of Wheat v. FTC, (8th Cir. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 40, and Shakespeare Co. v.
FTC, (6th Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 758.
31 Hills Bros. v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1926) 9 F. (2d) 481, and J. W. Kobi Co. v. FTC,
(2d Cir. 1927) 23 F. (2d) 41.
32 This assumes, of course, that the manufacturer wishes to control the prices of this
particular dealer. Possibly, the manufacturer would prefer not to antagonize an individual
price cutter by using threats ,to cut off his source of supply. On the other hand, should
the manufacturer wish to have no further dealings with a particular customer, it would
seem that he could refuse absolutely to deal with him. This would be most likely to occur
where there are other reasons for refusing to deal. But see Barber, "Refusals To Deal
Under the Federal Antitrust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 847 at 856, 857 (1955) for
possible dangers in this area.
33 Oppenheim, Oberndorf & Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 574; Moir v. FTC,
(1st Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 22; Armand Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 707.
34. See Rawleigh Co. v. Jones, 39 N.M. 381 at 387, 47 P. (2d) 906 (1935): The dealers
"maintained prices and territorial restrictions; not because of obligation voluntarily as-
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offending dealers again drawing attention to the manufacturer's
policy is permissible.35 It is uncertain how far beyond this point
the manufacturer may legally proceed, though there would seem
to be no objection to a more pointed reminder that the manufacturer will not hesitate to cut off a particular dealer who fails to
maintain the suggested resale prices. Should this prove unavailing,
it would seem that additional reminders would be useless and
more threatening warnings dangerous. 36 The seller must weigh
the loss of business incurred in cutting off a particular customer
against continuing negotiations with the risk of violating the law.
Since a finding of agreement is usually inferred, as an evidentiary matter it would seem advisable for a manufacturer to conduct negotiations with recalcitrant dealers entirely by correspondence, retaining a complete record of all transactions to rebut
any claim that assurances and promises were demanded fro~ the
dealer. The original policy statement should warn that no agent of
the manufacturer is authorized to make any statement beyond
the scope of the formulated policy.37 Should the manufacturer
wish to have personal contact with the dealer, it would seem wise
to assign this task to a person informed of the legal problems
involved. It would be preferable that all matters be referred to,
and all dealer contacts emanate from the home office, thus avoiding loose and perhaps damaging statements from salesmen understandably reluctant to lose profitable accounts.
D. If, despite repeated warnings, the dealer has continued
to sell below the suggested resale price and the manufacturer
has refused to have further dealings with him, the additional
problem arises whether the dealer can be reinstated without
violating the antitrust laws. There is a natural suspicion that
when sales are resumed to a dealer who has been cut off because

sumed, but from fear of consequences if they should not. . • . [They) acquiesced, as
Colgate's customers probably did, not because combined, but because their own interests
seemed to lie in acquiescing." See also Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Co. v. FTC, (6th
Cir. 1926) II F. (2d) 337.
35 For samples of letters approved by the courts see Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v.
FTC, (2d Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 274, and American Tobacco Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1925)
9 F. (2d) 570. Seemingly, there were objectionable features in the Ayer letter since it
called for the cooperation of the dealer, but this was overlooked by the court.
36 See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, (9th Cir. 1957) 246 F. (2d) 368. "If the refusal [by
defendant to sell] was not the result of the exercise of ordinary business judgment, but
the result of threats made and pressure applied . • ." the refusal is illegal. See also
United States v. J. I. Case Co., (D.C. Minn. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 856.
37 See United States v. J. I. Case Co., (D.C. Minn. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 856.
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of failure to sell at suggested prices, it is because the manufacturer
has received assurances of future compliance as a condition of
reinstatement. It is apparent that such assurances would invalidate any plan.88 With this exception, the cases are silent on the
problem of reinstatement, though again, 39 if the dealer takes
the initiative and gratuitously states that he will comply and the
manufacturer resumes shipments, this does not appear to be illegal. Perhaps an absolute refusal even to consider a resumption
of trade with a chronic price cutter would be the best deterrent
to others in that area, as indicative of the manufacturer's determination to secure observance of his policies. In general, it
seems that, while refraining from coercion, the strongest efforts
to bring the offender into line should be made before he is cut
off and the refusal to deal should ordinarily be made as a final
decision.
E. Though the foregoing discussion of the manufacturer's
policy toward retail dealers has general applicability to wholesalers as well, 40 there is one significant legal distinction. Whereas agreements will invalidate a plan on the retail level, in dealing
with wholesalers where the proposed course of action will affect a
third party, the retailer, there is a danger that a conspiracy or
combination to fix the retailer's resale prices may be found. 41 The
wholesaler, faced with alternative courses of action, must exercise
independent business judgment in choosing not to deal with
price cutters in order to free the plan from illegaliW under
Beech-Nut.

III
Throughout this discussion, the Colgate doctrine has been
examined only as a means of achieving resale price maintenance.
The right of refusal to deal, however, has a much broader appli-

as See Oppenheim, Obemdorf &: Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 574.
note 30 supra.
FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) and Armand Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir.
1935) 78 F. (2d) 707. In this connection it should be noted that when the channel of
distribution finds the wholesaler as a middleman, in effectuating his own plan to control
the prices of his retailers -he must refrain from conduct from which agreement may be
inferred. See American Tobacco Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 570.
41 See FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441 at 455 (1922), which condemns "methods
in which the company secures the cooperation of its distributors and customers, which
are quite as effectual as agreements.•••" Seemingly, the evidence necessary to show
conspiracy need not be as great as that showing actual agreement •.
89 See
40 See
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cation than this; its roots are in the common law which recognized the right of a private businessman to refuse to trade with
anyone and for any reason he deemed fit. 42 Absent a purpose
to monopolize or a monopoly position, there are few areas in
which the right of a single manufacturer to refuse to deal is
challenged._ This can best be understood by viewing the refusal
to deal not as an end ill" itself,43 but as a lever which can
be used to bring about desired action by the buyer. However,
it can prove to be an unwieldy tool and businessmen probably
will not use it unless other means are unavailable. Thus, many
of the objectives which a manufacturer seeks to accomplish may
be legally dealt with by contract and need not be effected by
means of refusal to deal. 44 It is only when refusals have as
their objective that which the antitrust' laws forbid to be done
by contract that they are seriously challenged.45 And they are
challenged not so much because of the undesirable purpose, antitrust-wise, but because the manufacturer must go beyond the rec-

42 See Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 16 S.W. Ill (1891); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., (2d Cir. 1915) 227 F. 46. See generally Dunn, "Resale Price
Maintenance," 32 YALE L. J. 676 at 678 (1923). But see Mund, "The Right To Buy-And
Its Denial to Small •Business," S. Doc. 32, 85th Cong., 1st sess. 10-12, 68 (1957). Dr. :',fund
denies the basic premise that the right of a businessman to select his customers and
refuse to deal was recognized at the early common law. The "language of the Colgate
case . . . is without sound basis either in the history of the common law or in the
economics of competitive markets." See also Adler, "Business Jurisprudence," 28 HARV.
L. REv. 135 at 158 (1914).
43 Of course, there are instances in which the manufacturer refuses absolutely to deal
with certain customers. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.,
(2d Cir. 1915) 227 F. 46, wherein the defendant wished to maintain a policy of dealing
only through wholesalers.
44 The following cases illustrate a number of reasons why a manufacturer may prefer
not to deal with a particular customer, and there is no serious antitrust objection to
his decision: Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., (2d Cir. 1915)
227 F. 46 (defendant dealt only with wholesalers); FTC v. Paramount Famous-Lasky
Corp., (2d Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 152 (respondent would not sell or lease films to theatres
who would not take a certain amount); Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co., (D.C. N.C.
1957) 149 F. Supp. 790 (inefficient operator); Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., (3d Cir. 1946)
155 F. (2d) 99 (to protect product good will); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp.,
(4th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 176, affirming (D.C. Md.) 138 F. Supp. 899, cert. den. 26 U.S.
Law Week 3108 (1957) (to establish exclusive dealerships); Johnson v. J. H. Yost Lumber
Co., (8th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 53 (as an ordinary business judgment preferring one
customer over another).
45 This is, of course, especially true when the intent is to fix resale prices. A similar
situation arises when a manufacturer wishes a dealer to sell only his products and cease
dealing in competitor's products. A sale or lease on this condition will come under the
terms of §3 of the Clayton Act. Compare United States v. J. I. Case Co., (D.C. Minn.
1951) 101 F. Supp. 856 and Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, (5th Cir. 1952) 200
F.- (2d) 911, cert. den. 345 U.S. 925 (1953), witl1 Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, (8th
Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 722.
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ognized abstract right and engage in policing practices to effectuate his purpose.46
Thus it can be seen that the Colgate doctrine involves, essentially, a balancing and resolving of the relative merits of
two often competing policies. 47 One of these is the freedom of
a manufacturer "to exercise his own independent discretion as
to parties with whom he will deal." 48 The other is expressed
in sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act forbidding "contract,
combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of" trade and attempts
to monopolize and monopolization, and in section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibiting "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair ... acts or practices." Conceptually, apologists of the Colgate doctrine would find it difficult to draw a distinction between the "acquiescence" of the dealer in the announced policies of the manufacturer as approved in Colgate
and the "agreement" and "cooperation" condemned in BeechNut.49 Certainly the effects of a successful plan under Colgate
would be much the same as under an express contract to fix
prices which is condemned as a per se violation under section I
of the Sherman Act.50 Yet, viewed in a business setting, there
would appear to be a significant legal difference between the
cases, and it is within this narrow area that the Colgate doctrine
has application. In the absence of antitrust violation, no case has
held that a manufacturer may not refuse to deal because of his
motive, good or bad. It is only when in pursuance of such purpose, agreements are entered into or cooperation is found between manufacturer and dealers, that the plan is illegal. Thus

46 Cf. Barber, "Refusals To Deal Under the Federal ,Antitrust Laws," 103 UNIV. PA.
L. REv. 847 at 880. "The pattern of conduct of which it forms a part, not the refusal
to deal, is the relevant object of antitrust inquiry."
47 RE.PORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 136 (1955).
48 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 at 307 (1919).
49 See especially Judge Frank's dissenting opinion in Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge
Distributing Co., (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 913. It is his belief that for any practical
purposes, the Colgate doctrine is dead; that anything beyond the bare refusal should
be struck down by the courts. "The difference, for practical purposes [between acquiescence
and agreement] is shadowy." Other cases and commentators have also indicated their
disapproval, though none of the cases have gone as far as Judge Frank would wish. See
Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Co. v. FTC, (6th Cir. 1926) II F. (2d) 337 at 342. "Yet
the difference between his express promise to observe the price hereafter and the implied
promise which he quite obviously makes to the same effect, if he asks the acceptance of
a further order, is not a sharp distinction."
50 See Dunn, "Resale Price Maintenance," 32 YALE L. J. 676 at 693 (1923).
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it is felt that the Colgate doctrine continues to provide a workable area outside the ambit of the antitrust laws as presently interpreted in which a manufacturer can maintain resale prices
by means of refusal to deal.

Raymond ]. Dittrich, Jr., S.Ed.

